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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses the effects of tax law complexity on the behavior of taxpayers. A particular 
focus is the effect of tax law complexity on taxpayers’ perceptions of the morality of taking 
deductions that might be disallowed. The topic of taxpayer morality is addressed in terms of the 
broader concept of deterrence theory, which suggests that deterrence factors include formal 
punishment, informal social punishment and the guilt that would be felt if a behavior were 
perceived to be immoral. Tax law complexity may give rise to the perception that taking a 
questionable deduction would be socially acceptable tax avoidance rather than socially 
unacceptable tax evasion, and that taking a questionable deduction is morally acceptable. It is 
hypothesized that greater tax law complexity is associated with less perception that taking 
questionable deductions is immoral, and that less perception that taking questionable deductions 
is immoral is associated with greater inclination to take questionable deductions. Accordingly, it 
is hypothesized that greater tax law complexity is associated with greater inclination to take 
questionable deductions. The study entailed an experimental survey in which subjects evaluated 
hypothetical scenarios in which the opportunity existed to save taxes by taking a deduction that 
might be disallowed. ANOVA and Regression results were consistent with the hypotheses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
t is sometimes said that you cannot legislate morality. The results of this study suggest that maybe you 
can. This paper addresses the effects of tax law complexity on the behavior of individual taxpayers. A 
particular focus is the possibility that tax law complexity may affect taxpayers' perceptions of the 
morality of taking deductions that might be disallowed, and that those perceptions of morality may affect taxpayers’ 
inclinations to take deductions. This paper suggests that if a tax law is clear and precise, taxpayers may view the 
taking of a questionable deduction to be immoral. In turn, it is suggested that taxpayers who consider the taking of a 
particular deduction to be immoral will be inclined to not take the deduction. Conversely, if a tax law is vague and 
complex, taxpayers may be less prone to view the taking of a questionable deduction to be immoral. Such taxpayers 
may be inclined to take the deduction. If an observer were to adopt the position that taking a questionable deduction 
is immoral, then it could be argued that the passing of clear, precise tax laws could be viewed as the legislation of 
morality, while the passing of complex tax laws could be viewed as the legislation of immorality. 
 
The study entailed an experiment in which subjects evaluated hypothetical scenarios. Through an 
experimental questionnaire, subjects were asked to imagine that in the preparation of their personal tax returns, they 
faced the opportunity to save taxes by taking a deduction that might be disallowed.  Manipulated variables were 
probability of disallowance and degree of tax law complexity related to the potential deduction.  Variables measured 
through a questionnaire included subjects' attitudes toward the morality of taking deductions and expectations of 
social consequences, as well as subjects' inclinations to take deductions. 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The Influence of Complexity 
 
Previous research on the relationship between tax law complexity and taxpayer compliance suggests that 
effects of tax law complexity may include influencing taxpayers’ risk attitudes and perceptions of costs, as well as 
taxpayers’ perceptions of equity. 
 
Regarding risk attitudes, it is suggested that tax law complexity may either increase or decrease taxpayer 
compliance depending on perceptions and conditions. Some studies (Alm, 1988; Hite and McGill, 1992; Westat, 
1980) suggest tax law complexity may increase compliance by inducing caution. If taxpayers associate uncertainty 
with risk, and if tax law complexity creates the perception of uncertainty regarding proper tax treatment, cautious 
taxpayers may be more likely to be compliant. Boortz and Linder (2005) suggest that the high cost of understanding 
a complex tax code induces some taxpayers to pay more taxes than necessary, while other taxpayers may pay less 
tax if they perceive that tax law complexity makes avoidance more difficult for the IRS to detect. Along similar 
lines, some studies (Graetz and Wilde, 1985, Milliron, 1985, New York State Bar Association, 1972) suggest that 
tax law complexity may decrease compliance by creating opportunities for noncompliance. A taxpayer may perceive 
that tax law complexity makes interpretation of tax laws difficult. In the event of a challenge by the IRS, tax law 
complexity may provide a defense for the taxpayer that would not exist if tax laws were concise and explicit. The 
proliferation of tax shelters may be an example of tax law complexity creating opportunities for noncompliance. For 
example, in the Frontline documentary “Tax Me If You Can”, Hendrick Smith (2003) reports on various tax shelters 
made possible by tax law complexity. 
 
Regarding perceptions of equity, theoretical studies (New York Bar Association, 1972) suggest that tax law 
complexity should enhance compliance. The argument is that in a complex economy, fairness and equity require tax 
law complexity, and that resultant perceptions of equity should encourage compliance. However, other studies 
related to equity (Carnes and Cuccia, 1996; Cuccia and Carnes, 2001, Dean, Keenan and Kenny, 1980; Milliron, 
1985) suggest that taxpayers may associate tax law complexity with inequity and unfairness. Taxpayers who 
perceive that complexity unfairly benefits other taxpayers may feel that noncompliance is justified to correct 
inequities. Taxpayers who perceive that tax law complexity is not justified may perceive the tax system to be 
inequitable and may be prone to noncompliance. 
 
Differing perceptions by taxpayers of degree of risk, cost of compliance, magnitude of tax and penalty, 
inequitable taxation in comparison with other taxpayers, degree of justification for tax law complexity and other 
factors makes the effects of tax law complexity difficult to determine. The current study attempts to control for some 
of these factors by creating hypothetical scenarios in which comparisons with other taxpayers and justification is not 
an issue, and which explicitly state the probability of disallowance of a particular deduction, and the amount of tax 
and penalty involved. This allows for a focus on differences in perceptions of the morality of taking a particular 
deduction under conditions of low complexity and high complexity of tax laws. The issue addressed is the message 
that a society communicates with its tax laws. 
 
Deterrence Factors 
 
The hypothesis that tax law complexity influences taxpayer behavior through its influence on perceptions 
of morality is largely based on the general hypothesis that perceptions of morality affect behavior. Consider, then, 
the general theory of the influence of perceptions of morality on behavior. 
 
The hypothesis that perceptions of morality affects behavior is part of Deterrence Theory (Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2001; Grasmick and Green, 1980,  Grasmick and Scott, 1982; Pogarsky, Piquero & Paternoster, 2004;  
Silberman, 1976; Wrong, 1961), which posits that when a decision maker contemplates a deviant act, a number of 
factors may give rise to expectations of potentially undesirable consequences.  Such expectations may tend to inhibit 
or deter a particular behavior. 
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Deterrence factors fall into three major categories: (1) formal punishment; (2) informal punishment; and (3) 
internalized norms or moral commitment. Formal punishment entails officially prescribed penalties imposed on 
those who are caught and convicted of a forbidden act.  Formal punishment may include fines, imprisonment, 
revocation of licenses and other disciplinary actions. The degree of deterrence is posited to be a function of 
perceptions of expected punishment.  The greater the severity and/or probability of formal punishment the greater 
the degree of deterrence. 
 
Informal punishment entails social punishment imposed by one's peers, family, friends, co-workers and 
other associates, when a person's law-breaking is publicly exposed.  Perceived consequences of the imposition of 
informal punishment may include embarrassment, humiliation, social ostracization, and other forms of social stigma.  
The greater a decision-maker's perceptions of expected social punishment, the greater the degree of deterrence. 
 
Internalized norms or moral commitment entails a decision-maker's belief that certain behaviors are 
contrary to his or her moral standards.  As a result of exposure to the influences of family, religion, schools and 
other learning experiences, a person may develop personal standards of right and wrong.  A person may feel 
compelled to avoid behavior that is morally wrong.  A decision-maker may perceive that if a particular action would 
violate personal moral standards, feelings of guilt might arise.  Even if a person were not caught, and if neither 
formal punishment nor informal punishment were imposed, feelings of guilt would still arise.  The greater the 
expectation of feelings of guilt, the greater the degree of deterrence. 
 
Reviews of studies of the deterrence of tax noncompliance (Alm, 1991; Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998; 
Cowell, 1990; Graentz & Wilde, 1985; Hasselding and Bebbington, 1991; Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Mason & 
Calvin, 1978, 1984; Milliron & Toy, 1988; Roth & Scholtz, 1989; Witte and Woodbury, 1983; Weigel, Hessing and 
Elffers 1987) present results that are somewhat mixed. In general, research findings suggest that deterrence factors 
influence taxpayer behavior in a manner consistent with deterrence theory. 
 
In the current study, formal punishment is defined as a penalty to be imposed in addition to taxes due in the 
event that a deduction is disallowed by the IRS. In the hypothetical scenarios presented to subjects, magnitude of tax 
and penalty was held constant, while probability of disallowance was manipulated. Accordingly, expected formal 
punishment was varied through manipulation of probability of disallowance. Subjects' perceptions of expected social 
punishment and moral commitment were measured through a questionnaire. In terms of the variables of the current 
study, deterrence theory hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the probability that the IRS will disallow deductions and 
inclination to take the deductions. 
 
H2: Greater perception of expected social punishment will be associated with less inclination to take 
deductions. 
 
H3: Greater perception that taking deductions is immoral will be associated with less inclination to take 
deductions. 
 
Formation of Moral Values 
 
To understand how tax law complexity affects perceptions of morality, begin by considering morality in 
general. Morality entails a person's perceptions of right and wrong behavior. Hazlitt (1964) suggests that social 
cooperation is the heart of morality. Moral behavior entails conduct that will enhance the well-being of others while 
also enhancing the well being of the individual. Behavior consistent with the concept of social cooperation includes 
mutual agreements between people to not kill each other, to not rape, assault, rob or otherwise harm others. 
 
A society's moral values are typically expressed in the form of laws that prohibit certain behavior. 
However, not all laws reflect morality. In addressing the issue of laws and morality, criminology theory (Hagan, 
2008; Inciari, 1993; Siegal, 2007) describe two categories of prohibited actions: mala in se and mala prohibita. A 
behavior that is mala in se is a behavior that is inherently wrong, and is universally perceived to be immoral. In 
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terms of ethical philosophy (Audi, 1997, 2005), mala in se may be related to intuitionism, which suggests that for 
many behaviors, immorality is self-evident. 
 
An act that is mala prohibita is a crime not because it is inherently wrong, but rather because a law 
prohibits the act. Along these lines, Healy (2004) describes examples such as shipping products in plastic bags when 
the law requires paper bags. In some cases laws may be contrary to morality. For example, Hasnas (2006, page 59) 
states: “But ethics is not coextensive with legality, and responding to legal incentives does not guarantee that an 
organization is acting ethically, as the Jim Crow legislation that mandated social segregation makes abundantly 
clear.” 
 
Regarding the effects of laws on moral attitudes, it can be inferred that even if there were no laws against 
murder and assault, most people would consider those acts to be immoral. Conversely, it can be inferred that the 
existence of laws prohibiting the use of plastic bags will not make most people believe such use is immoral. This 
would seem to suggest that laws do little to influence morality. 
 
While at the extremes of mala in se and mala prohibita, laws may have little effect on moral attitudes, it 
seems plausible that there is some middle ground where the morality or immorality of an act is not obvious. For such 
acts, laws may provide moral guidance. Compliance with tax laws may be an example of that middle ground. 
 
Spicer (1986, p. 13) quotes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ statement that “taxes are the price of 
civilization”. If civilization is characterized by social cooperation, and if people benefit from living in a civilized 
society, it might be inferred that people have a moral obligation to support civilization. To the extent that civilization 
exists because government provides national defense, police protection, highways, social programs, etc., members of 
a society perceive a moral obligation to pay taxes. 
 
Tax Law Complexity and Moral Values 
 
Although people may recognize a moral obligation to pay taxes, there is likely to be a question of what 
amount of taxes fulfills that moral obligation. It seems plausible that taxpayers perceive their moral obligation to be 
the amount required by tax law. However, if determining the true amount of tax due is a difficult task, a taxpayer 
may perceive there to be moral ambiguity. 
 
To understand how tax law complexity may affect taxpayer's attitudes, consider the implication of the 
general idea that it is largely through laws that a society communicates what it considers to be unacceptable 
behavior, and that a person's attitudes and expectations may be influenced by laws and punishment for law-breaking. 
In addressing the issue of punishment as moral education, Wilson & Herrnstein (1985) suggest that a society teaches 
disapproval through punishment, stating (on p. 495) that “If punishment tells the members of a community what it 
considers wrong, the absence of punishment must tell them what it does not consider wrong”. This seems to suggest 
that if a person perceives that society forbids and punishes an action, that person may perceive that action to be 
immoral. However, if a law is complex and ambiguous, a person may have difficulty determining the moral message 
that is being communicated. 
 
It might be inferred that the degree to which a behavior is perceived to be morally wrong might be a 
function of the complexity of laws.  If there is a strong consensus that a behavior is unacceptable, that 
unacceptability will be conveyed through laws that are precise and explicit. However, if a law is imprecise, complex 
and difficult to interpret, a person may perceive that society feels ambivalent towards the behavior and that the 
behavior is more acceptable.  Accordingly, moral commitment to a complex, imprecise law may be less than the 
moral commitment to a precise, explicit law. 
 
In the case of taxpayer behavior, it seems plausible that if tax laws regarding a particular deduction were 
precise and explicit in prohibiting the deduction, a taxpayer would be inclined to perceive taking the deduction to be 
socially unacceptable tax evasion. Alternately, if tax laws regarding a deduction were complex and imprecise, a 
taxpayer would be more likely to perceive taking the deduction to be socially acceptable tax avoidance. This would 
be consistent with the survey findings of Westat (1980, as quoted in Jackson and Milliron, 1986, p. 137) that "If a 
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position could be justified by some interpretation of the rules, even though likely to be disallowed by the IRS, the 
majority of taxpayers felt an aggressive position to be morally defensible." 
 
If tax law complexity gives rise to perceptions that taking questionable deductions is morally justifiable, the 
following can be hypothesized: 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between tax law complexity and taxpayers' perceptions that taking 
deductions is immoral. 
 
Tax law complexity may also be related to expectation of social punishment. If a person’s development of 
moral attitudes arises from perceptions of the expectations of others, and if a person chooses behavior in part to meet 
those expectations and to please others, it can be inferred that the choice of immoral behavior could result in social 
punishment. If tax law complexity were to convey that society considers taking questionable deduction to be morally 
justified, a person may perceive that taking the deduction will not result in social punishment. This can be 
hypothesized as follows: 
 
H5: There is a negative relationship between tax law complexity and taxpayers’ perceptions of expected social 
punishment that would arise in the event that deductions were disallowed. 
 
If tax law complexity influences taxpayers’ perceptions of the social acceptability and morality of taking 
deductions, and if a person is reluctant to commit an immoral act, then tax law complexity may affect taxpayer 
behavior through its effects on perceptions of social acceptability and morality. That is, if greater tax law complexity 
is associated with greater perceptions that taking a deduction is socially acceptable and morally proper, and if a 
greater perception of social acceptability and moral appropriateness is associated with greater inclination to take a 
deduction, the following can be hypothesized: 
 
H6: There is a positive relationship between tax law complexity and taxpayer inclination to take deductions that 
might be disallowed. 
 
The hypothesized relationships are depicted in Figure 1. The arrows between tax law complexity and both 
expected social punishment and perceptions of morality suggest that tax law complexity influences both expected 
social punishment and perceptions of morality. The three arrows between probability of penalty, expected social 
punishment, perception of morality and inclination to take deductions suggest that each of these three deterrence 
factors influences the inclination to take deductions. If the levels of expected social punishment and perceptions of 
morality are influenced by tax law complexity, it can be inferred that tax law complexity may affect inclination to 
take deductions. 
 
Figure 1 Hypothesized Relationships 
 
 
 
 
Tax Law 
Complexity 
Probability of 
Penalty 
Expected Social 
Punishment 
Perceptions of 
Morality 
 
Inclination to Take 
Deductions 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2013 Volume 29, Number 5 
1484 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The Study in General 
 
The study entailed an experimental survey in which subjects evaluated tax-related hypothetical scenarios, 
along the lines of studies by Anderson, Harris and Miller (1983); Chang (1984); Kaplan and Reckers (1985);  
Kaplan, Reckers and Reynolds (1986); Jackson and Spicer (1986);  Chang, Nichols and Schultz (1987);  Violette 
(1987);  Kaplan, Reckers and Roark (1988);  Schadewald (1988, 1989);  and Schepanski and Kelsey (1990).  Each 
scenario presented a situation in which the opportunity exists to reduce income taxes by taking certain deductions 
that might be disallowed.  Subjects were told that in the event of disallowance, a penalty would be imposed in 
addition to unpaid tax. 
 
For each scenario, subjects were asked to imagine that in the preparation of their personal tax returns, they 
faced the same set of circumstances, and to state the degree to which they would be inclined to take the deduction. 
 
In addition to analyzing a hypothetical scenario, each subject was asked to complete a post-experimental 
questionnaire addressing demographic data, attitudes, and other information.  Items included questions regarding 
perceptions of expected social consequences and the morality of taking deductions.  Sample experimental 
instruments are presented in the appendix. 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were night students taking graduate business courses at Duquesne University, Robert Morris 
University and the University of Pittsburgh, plus night undergraduate students at Pennsylvania State University, 
McKeesport Campus. Many of the subjects had day jobs and had filed tax returns for a number of years.  Subjects 
completed 234 usable surveys. 
 
A summary of subjects’ demographics is presented in Figure 2. 
 
 Range Median     
Age 19-58 28     
Years Filed 0-37 10     
 
Form Used 1040 1040A 1040EZ Not Required 
to File 
No Response  
 48% 27% 19% 3% 2%  
 (114/234) (63/234) (45/234) (7/234) (5/234)  
 
Filing Status Single Married Filing 
Jointly 
Married Filing 
Separately 
Head of 
Household 
No Response  
 55% 42% 0.4% 1% 2%  
 (128/234) (98/234) (1/234) (3/234) (4/234)  
 
Household 
Income 
Less than 
$20,000 
$20,001- 
40,000 
$40,001- 
70,000 
$70,001-
100,000 
More than 
$100,000 
No Response 
 11% 29% 36% 14% 6% 3% 
 (23/234) (67/234) (85/234) (33/234) (15/234) (8/234) 
Figure 2 Subjects' Demographics 
 
Levels of Independent Variables 
 
To control for some of the problems that arise in the study of tax law complexity, the amount of tax, the 
amount of penalty and the probability of disallowance were stated in the scenarios. If problems with the 
determination of the effects of tax law complexity arise from differences in taxpayers’ perceptions of the amount of 
tax involved and the probability of disallowance, the explicit statement of those figures should allow for the focus on 
the moral message conveyed by tax law complexity. 
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In each scenario, the amount of the potential deduction, and the tax rate, were held constant at $2,000 and 
30%, respectively. Thus, in each scenario, potential tax savings was $600. 
 
Probability of disallowance had three levels: 1%, 30% and 60%.  A range of probabilities allows the testing 
of relationships between probability of disallowance and inclination to take deductions.  The lowest probability, 1%, 
which results in very low expected penalty, may provide insight into the deterrent effect of perceptions of expected 
social consequences and morality.  If probability of disallowance were 1%, it might be inferred that any inclination 
to not take deductions would be due to other factors. 
 
Penalty rate was held constant in all scenarios at 75% of additional tax imposed.  Table 1 presents a 
calculation of expected outcomes at different levels of probability. 
 
Table 1 Calculation of Expected Outcomes 
Probability of 
Disallowance 
(1) 
Penalty Rate 
(as % of Tax) 
(2) 
Expected Penalty 
(as % of Tax) 
(1) X (2) 
Expected Outcome* 
(as %of Tax) 
1% 75% 0.75% 98.25% 
30% 75% 22.50% 47.50% 
60% 75% 45.00% (5.00%) 
* Expected Outcome is the expected net benefits of taking the deduction, calculated as potential tax savings reduced by expected 
additional tax and penalty.  Expressed as a percentage of potential tax savings, expected outcome is calculated as [100% - 
{Probability of disallowance (100% + Penalty Rate)}]. 
 
Tax law complexity had two levels: low and high.  In the low complexity scenarios, tax laws were 
described as precise and explicit.  The scenario stated that certain deductions are definitely illegal, and that to take 
the deductions would be tax evasion.  Probability of disallowance was described as a function of the audit rate 
and/or the degree of scrutiny. 
 
In the high complexity scenarios, tax laws were described as complex and ambiguous. The scenarios stated 
that tax laws regarding the deductions in question are very difficult to understand, and that deductibility is subject to 
interpretation. Probability of disallowance was expressed in terms of the likelihood that a decision would be made 
against the taxpayer's position. 
 
Hypothetical Scenarios 
 
Each hypothetical scenario presented a combination of independent variables described in the preceding. 
Since there are three levels of probability and two levels of tax law complexity, there were six combinations of 
independent variables. Each subject evaluated one scenario. 
 
The dependent variable measured in each scenario was inclination to take deductions, measured on a nine-
point scale.  Along the lines of instruments administered by Chang (1984); Schadewald (1988); and Schepanski and 
Kelsey (1990), subjects were asked to state the degree to which they would be inclined to take deductions.  
Response choices ranged from "definitely would not take the deductions" to "definitely would take the deductions". 
 
A sample experimental instrument is presented in the Appendix. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Hypotheses were tested by running Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Regression and related analyses.  Data 
was entered as follows:  Degree of inclination was coded on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 for "Definitely would not 
take the deduction" to 9 for "Definitely would take the deduction".  Complexity was coded 1 for "low complexity" 
and 2 for "high complexity".  Probability of disallowance was coded as 1, 30 or 60, corresponding to 1%, 30% and 
60%.  Morality was coded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 for "perfectly ethical" to 7 for "extremely unethical". 
Social consequences was coded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 for "no adverse social consequences" to 7 for 
"severe adverse social consequences". 
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Consider first the relationship between Inclination to take deductions and the manipulated variables of 
Probability of disallowance and Complexity of tax laws.  Table 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of 
inclination for each level of Probability and Complexity.  Table 3 presents the ANOVA results for Inclination by 
Probability and Complexity. 
 
Table 2 Breakdown Results Inclination by Probability and Complexity 
Probability 1% 30% 60% 
Mean 6.0000 5.1164 4.0897 
Std. Dev. 2.9586 2.8007 2.4558 
Sample Size n = 78 n = 78 n = 78 
    
Complexity Low High  
Mean 4.4530 5.6838  
Std. Dev. 2.8512 2.7122  
Sample Size n = 117 n = 117  
 
Table 3 ANOVA Results Inclination by Probability and Complexity 
Factor Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F-Stat Sig of F 
Probability 142.573 2 71.286 9.906 .0000 
Complexity 88.615 1 88.615 12.314 .001 
 
The tables show that the effects of Probability is highly significant (F = 9.906, Sig of F = .0000) in the 
predicted direction.  Higher levels of probability of disallowance are associated with lower inclination to take 
questionable deductions.  This is consistent with Hypothesis # 1.  The effects of Complexity is also highly 
significant (F = 12.314, Sig of F = .001) in the predicted direction.  Greater complexity of tax laws is associated with 
greater inclination to take questionable deductions.  This is consistent with Hypothesis # 6. 
 
To test the effects of measured variables, regressions were run.  Table 4 presents regression results for 
Inclination and Expected Social Consequences of taking questionable deductions.  The negative relationship is 
highly significant (T = -6.784, Sig of T = .0000) in the predicted direction, consistent with Hypothesis # 2.  Greater 
perception that taking deductions would result in adverse social consequences is associated with less inclination to 
take deductions. 
 
Table 4 Regression Results: Inclination vs. Social Consequences 
Variable Constant B SE of B T-Stat Sig of T 
Social 
Consequences 
7.038950 -.684146 .100845 -6.784 .0000 
R Value:  .40687;  R Squared:  .16554 
 
Table 5 presents regression results for Inclination and perceptions of the Morality of taking questionable 
deductions.  The negative relationship is highly significant (T = -10.449, Sig of T = .0000) in the predicted direction, 
consistent with Hypothesis # 3.  Greater perception that taking deduction is immoral is associated with less 
inclination to take deductions. 
 
Table 5 Regression Results: Inclination vs. Perceptions of Morality 
Variable Constant B SE of B T-Stat Sig of T 
Morality 8.420151 -.859995 .082306 -10.449 0000 
R Value:  .56568;  R Squared:  .32000 
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As a further test of the effects of expected social consequences and perceptions of morality, Table 6 
presents results of a multiple regression. Inclination was the dependent variable. Expected social consequences and 
perceptions of morality were independent variables. For expected social consequences, the negative relationship was 
significant (T = -2.644415, Sig of T = .0087) in the predicted direction, consistent with Hypothesis # 2. For 
perceptions of morality, the negative relationship was significant (T = -7.813511, Sig of T = .0000), consistent with 
Hypothesis # 3. 
 
Table 6 Multiple Regression Results: Inclination vs. Social Consequences and Perceptions of Morality 
Variable Constant B SE of B T-Stat Sig of T 
 8.724576     
Social 
Consequences 
 -.275067 .104018 -2.644415 .0087 
Morality  -.73482 .094045 -7.813511 .0000 
Multiple R Value:  .583076;  Multiple R Squared:  .339978 
 
The lower levels of significance in the multiple regression is reasonable considering that perceptions of 
morality is theorized to be influenced by societal expectations and that expected social consequences and 
perceptions of morality could be expected to be related. That relationship is addressed in Table 7, which reports the 
regression results of perceptions of morality and expected social consequences. There is a significant positive 
correlation (T = 8.872292, Sig of T = .0000). 
 
Table 7 Regression Results: Perceptions of Morality vs. Social Consequences 
Variable Constant B SE of B T-Stat Sig of T 
Social 
Consequences 
2.293931 .556707 .062747 8.872292 .0000 
R Value:  .50333;  R Squared:  .253341 
 
Next consider the effects of complexity on expected social consequences and perceptions of morality.  
Table 8 presents Means and Standard Deviations of expected social consequences for each level of complexity.  
Table 9 presents ANOVA results for expected Social Consequences by Complexity. 
 
Table 8 Breakdown Results: Social Consequences by Complexity 
Level of Complexity Low High 
Mean 3.1795 2.5812 
Standard Deviation 1.6949 1.6413 
Sample Size n = 117 n = 117 
 
Table 9 Anova Results: Social Consequences by Complexity 
Factor Sum of Square DF Mean Square F-Stat Sig of F 
Complexity 20.940 1 20.940 7.524 .007 
 
These tables show that the relationship between expected social consequences and complexity is significant 
(F = 7.524, Sig of F = .007) in the predicted direction. Greater tax law complexity is associated with less expectation 
of social punishment, consistent with Hypothesis # 5. 
 
Table 10 presents Means and Standard Deviations of perceptions of Morality for each level of Complexity.  
Table 11 presents ANOVA results for perceptions of Morality by Complexity. 
 
Table 10 Breakdown Results: Perceptions of Morality by Complexity 
Level of Complexity Low High 
Mean 4.5385 3.2564 
Standard Deviation 1.7298 1.7915 
Sample Size n = 117 n = 117 
 
Table 11 ANOVA Results: Perceptions of Morality by Complexity 
Factor Sum of Square DF Mean Square F-Stat Sig of F 
Complexity 96.154 1 96.154 31.009 .000 
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These tables show that the relationship between perceptions of Morality and level of Complexity is highly 
significant (F = 31.009, Sig of F = .000) in the predicted direction.  Greater tax law complexity is associated with 
less perception that taking a deduction is immoral, consistent with Hypothesis # 4. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results are consistent with the hypotheses. Tax law complexity is significantly related to inclination to 
take deductions, consistent with Hypothesis # 6.  This seems to suggest that complex and ambiguous tax laws may 
give rise to greater tendency for taxpayers' to take questionable deductions than if tax laws were precise and explicit. 
 
The results are also consistent with deterrence theory, addressed by Hypotheses # 1, # 2, and # 3.  
Significant relationships suggest that deterrence factors of probability of disallowance, expectations of social 
punishment, and perceptions that taking deductions is immoral are statistically related to taxpayers' inclination to 
take questionable deductions.  It can be inferred that if levels of deterrence factors were to change, inclination to 
take questionable deductions might change as well. 
 
The remaining hypotheses, which address the question of whether tax law complexity might influence 
moral and social factors (Hypotheses # 4 and # 5), are supported as well. Complexity is significantly related to both 
perceptions of morality and expectations of social punishment. This seems to be consistent with the suggestion that 
if tax laws were precise and explicit rather than complex and ambiguous, taxpayers might be more prone to expect 
the taking of questionable deductions to lead to social punishment, and to perceive the taking of those deductions to 
be immoral. 
 
With regard to the influence of complexity, it should be noted that while statistically significant results 
suggest that complexity may affect social expectations and moral attitudes, complexity is by no means the sole 
determinant of a taxpayer's expectations and attitudes.  Many factors influence a person's social expectations and 
moral attitudes, including family, religion, friends and other social factors, as well as complexity of laws.  
Accordingly, the elimination of tax law complexity could not be expected to result in the perception that 
noncompliance is morally reprehensible.  However, it seems plausible that reduction in tax law complexity might 
contribute to an increase in the perception that noncompliance is immoral and socially unacceptable, and, in turn, 
would contribute to a reduction in noncompliance. 
 
It should also be noted that most determinants of social expectations and moral attitudes are beyond the 
control of tax policy makers. Also, in a large, complex economy, tax law complexity may be necessary. To provide 
for the deductibility of a large array of legitimate expenses, to encourage investment, to encourage home ownership 
and other policy objectives, tax law complexity may be justified. A degree of noncompliance may be a reasonable 
trade-off for the achievement of policy objectives. However, if the reduction of tax law complexity could have a 
marginal effect on compliance, tax policy makers may want to at least consider the reduction of unnecessary tax law 
complexity. 
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APPENDIX:  SAMPLE INSTRUMENT 
 
(It should be noted that in the surveys completed by subjects, the terms “low complexity scenario” and 
“high complexity scenario” were not stated. Those phrases are included to provide a better understanding by the 
reader of this paper) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project.  Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
 
This study entails your evaluation of a series of tax-related scenarios.  In this study we seek to better 
understand the decision-making processes of taxpayers. 
 
We want to emphasize that this study is being conducted by academic researchers.  This research project is 
not connected to the IRS or any other taxing authority.  The identity of participants will be kept strictly confidential.  
Individual responses will be anonymous.  Do not write your name on this document. 
 
PART 1 
 
In this section you are to evaluate a hypothetical scenario entailing the filing of a tax return.  Please read the 
scenario carefully and thoroughly and then state what you would do if you were the taxpayer in the scenario. 
 
You may notice that the conditions described and other information presented may differ from your 
perceptions of the real world.  These differences are intentional and are an important part of the study.  One of the 
goals of this study is to gain a better understanding of decision making in a variety of hypothetical scenarios.  
Accordingly, we want you to carefully read the scenario, and respond as though you actually faced the 
circumstances described in each scenario. 
 
Please turn the page and begin. 
 
Low Complexity Scenario (See Note Above) 
 
Assume that it is April and you are preparing to file your Federal income tax return.  Further assume that 
you are employed in a job requiring travel and meeting with clients.  When you file your tax return, you take 
deductions for employee business expenses, including travel and entertainment. 
 
During the year you incurred a number of unreimbursed expenditures including trips that were part 
business and part personal vacation, living expenses for family members who accompanied you on temporary out of 
town assignments, meeting with clients at restaurants and nightclubs, and other similar expenditures. 
 
A tax consultant has told you that some of these expenditures are not deductible.  The tax laws with regard 
to these particular expenditures are precise and explicit.  To deduct these items as part of employee business 
expenses would be tax evasion. 
 
Further assume that due to limitations in the IRS's ability to thoroughly scrutinize all tax returns, there is 
some likelihood that the IRS would not challenge the deduction.   
 
The expenditures under consideration total $2,000, and your tax rate is 30%;  Thus, if you were to take the 
deductions, your tax savings would be $600. 
 
In the event of disallowance, tax must be paid.  And since, in that event, the additional taxes represent 
underpayment, additional costs are imposed in the form of interest, penalties, fines, legal costs and other expenses 
which are to be collectively designated as "penalty". 
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High Complexity Scenario (See Note On Preceding Page) 
 
Assume that it is April and you are preparing to file your Federal income tax return.  Further assume that 
you are employed in a job requiring travel and meeting with clients.  When you file your tax return, you take 
deductions for employee business expenses, including travel and entertainment. 
 
During the year you incurred a number of unreimbursed expenditures, including trips that were part 
business and part personal vacation, living expenses for family members who accompanied you on temporary out of 
town assignments, meeting with clients at restaurants and nightclubs, and other similar expenditures. 
 
A tax consultant has told you that determination of the deductibility of some of these expenditures is 
difficult. The tax laws regarding employee business expenses are very complex, ambiguous and difficult to 
understand.  The deductibility of these items is subject to interpretation.  Accordingly, there is some likelihood that 
the IRS may challenge these deductions.  However, because of the complexity and ambiguity of the tax laws, the 
resolution of the matter could be in your favor. 
 
The expenditures under consideration total $2,000, and your tax rate is 30%; Thus, if you were to take the 
deductions, your tax savings would be $600. 
 
In the event of disallowance, tax must be paid.  And since, in that event, the additional taxes represent 
underpayment, additional costs are imposed in the form of interest, penalty, fines, legal costs, and other expenses 
which are to be collectively designated as "penalty". 
 
Assume that the penalty rate is 75% of additional taxes.  Thus, in the event of disallowance, $600 of tax 
will be imposed, plus a penalty of $450. 
 
Assume that a tax consultant has told you that if you do choose to take the deductions, there is a 1% 
probability that the IRS will disallow it. 
 
If you faced this scenario, how inclined would you be to take the deductions?  (Indicate the one statement 
that is most appropriate.) 
 
 ____ Definitely would take the deductions. 
 ____ Strongly inclined to take the deductions. 
 ____ Moderately inclined to take the deductions. 
 ____ Slightly inclined to take the deductions. 
 ____ Indifferent between taking and not taking the deductions. 
 ____ Slightly inclined to not take the deductions. 
 ____ Moderately inclined to not take the deductions. 
 ____ Strongly inclined to not take the deductions. 
 ____ Definitely would not take the deductions. 
 
PART 2 
 
As the final stage of this study, we would greatly appreciate your completion of the following 
questionnaire: 
 
(1) (A) In evaluating the hypothetical scenario presented in Part 1, to what extent were you able to realistically 
imagine what your reaction would have been in the same situation? 
 
 ____ I could imagine what my reaction would be without question 
 ____ To a very high degree 
 ____ To a moderate degree 
 ____ To a slight degree 
 ____ Not at all 
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(1) (B) If the additional tax and the penalty imposed, as described in the scenario, were imposed on you personally, 
how substantial a hardship (if at all) would it be?: 
 
 ____ No financial hardship at all. 
 ____  A slight financial hardship. 
 ____ A moderate financial hardship. 
 ____ A severe financial hardship. 
 ____ A catastrophic financial hardship. 
 
(2) (A) Which tax form do you typically use when filing you tax return? 
 
 ____ Form 1040     (long form) 
 ____ Form 1040A   (short form) 
 ____ Form 1040 EZ 
 ____ Not required to file, because __________________________ 
 
(2) (B) Approximately how many years have you filed a tax return? _____________ 
 
(3) (A) In filing your own personal tax return, if you were to face the circumstances described in the scenario, to 
what extent would you consider taking the deductions to be immoral or unethical?: 
 
Perfectly               Extremely 
Ethical               Unethical 
 
 1   2   3    4     5   6     7 
 
(3) (B) If you were to take the deductions described in the scenario, to what extent would  you expect to 
experiences feelings of guilt?: 
 
No Feelings               Great Feelings 
of Guilt               of Guilt 
 
 1   2   3    4     5   6     7 
 
(3) (C) Assuming that you were to take the deductions described in the scenario, and that your personal tax return 
was subsequently audited, an underpayment determined, and penalties imposed:  to what extent (if at all) 
would you expect embarrassment, social castigation or other forms of adverse social consequences? 
 
No Adverse               Severe Adverse 
Social Consequences            Social Consequences 
 
 1   2   3    4     5   6     7 
 
(3) (D) To what extent do you consider yourself to be familiar with IRS regulations and  enforcement activities? 
 
Not At All               Very 
Familiar               Familiar 
 
 1   2   3    4     5   6     7 
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(3) (E) To what extent do you consider the amount of taxes you pay to be fair and equitable in relation to the total 
benefits you receive from the government? 
 
 ____ My taxes paid are much less than the benefits I receive.  
 ____ My taxes paid are somewhat less than the benefits I receive.  
 ____ My taxes paid and benefits received are just about in balance. 
 ____ My taxes paid are somewhat more than the benefits I receive. 
 ____ My taxes paid are much greater than the benefits I receive. 
 
(4) (A) What is your age?  _____________ 
 
(4) (B) Gender? ______ Male  ______ Female 
 
(4) (C) What is your filing status? _____ Single _____ Married, Joint Return 
   _____ Married, Separate Return  _____ Head of Household 
 
(4) (D) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 ____ Less than 12 years  ____ College (Associate's Degree) 
 ____ High School   ____ College (Bachelor's Degree) 
 ____ Some College   ____ Master's Degree 
        ____ Doctorate 
 
(4) (E) What is your occupation? ________________________ 
 
(4) (F) What is your annual household income? 
 _____ Under $20,000 
 _____ $20,001 - $40,000 
 _____ $40,001 - $70,000 
 _____ $70,001 - $100,000 
 _____ More than $100,000 
